Optimal auction duration: A price formation viewpoint by Jusselin, Paul et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
01
71
3v
3 
 [q
-fi
n.T
R]
  2
9 J
un
 20
20
Optimal auction duration:
A price formation viewpoint
Paul Jusselin∗, Thibaut Mastrolia† and Mathieu Rosenbaum‡
E´cole Polytechnique, CMAP
June 30, 2020
Version with supplementary material
Abstract
We consider an auction market in which market makers fill the order book during a given time
period while some other investors send market orders. We define the clearing price of the auction
as the price maximizing the exchanged volume at the clearing time according to the supply and
demand of each market participants. Then we derive in a semi-explicit form the error made
between this clearing price and the efficient price as a function of the auction duration. We
study the impact of the behavior of market takers on this error. To do so we consider the case of
naive market takers and that of rational market takers playing a Nash equilibrium to minimize
their transaction costs. We compute the optimal duration of the auctions for 77 stocks traded
on Euronext and compare the quality of price formation process under this optimal value to the
case of a continuous limit order book. Continuous limit order books are found to be usually
sub-optimal. However, in term of our metric, they only moderately impair the quality of price
formation process. Order of magnitude of optimal auction durations is from 2 to 10 minutes.
Keywords: Microstructure, market design, auctions, limit order books, continuous trading, market
making, Nash equilibrium, BSDEs.
1 Introduction
In most historical (lit) markets, trading operates through a continuous-time double auction system:
the continuous limit order book (CLOB). This mechanism allows market participants to buy or sell
shares at any time point at the quoted prices. However market orders systematically pay (at least)
the spread as transaction cost. Moreover volumes impact prices as market makers readjust their
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positions in reaction to the order flow, resulting in additional trading costs. Beyond this, it has
been argued that some mechanical flaws are inherent to CLOBs, particularly in the context of high
frequency trading. The debate started in the academic literature notably with the very influential
paper Budish et al. (2015), see also Farmer and Skouras (2012); Wah and Wellman (2013). In this
work, the authors explain that CLOBs lead to obvious mechanical arbitrage and generate a compe-
tition in speed rather than in price between high frequency market makers, to the detriment of final
investors. They convincingly show that frequent batch auctions could be a way to remedy these
flaws.
The idea that auctions could be a suitable mechanism for the functioning of financial markets is not
new. For example, in the important paper Madhavan (1992), see also Garbade and Silber (1979),
the interest of auctions compared to CLOBs is already investigated. Of course the discussion in
this work is not about high frequency arbitrage opportunities, but rather on the fact that auctions
could be beneficial for the price formation process by enabling investors to trade directly between
each others, avoiding to pay spread costs to market makers.
In Budish et al. (2015), the authors provide the order of magnitude of a lower bound for auction pe-
riod leading to elimination of the high frequency flaws of CLOBs (about 100 milliseconds). However,
the mentioned earlier literature suggests that longer auction times could be suitable, but usually
without giving figures. This is why, quoting Budish et al. (2015), developing a richer understanding
of the costs of lengthening the time between auctions is an important topic. This is exactly what we
do in this paper. We provide a sound and operational quantitative analysis of the optimal auction
duration on a financial market, and compare the efficiency of this mechanism with that of a CLOB.
We work with a criterion based on quality of the price formation process as in Madhavan (1992),
but in the context of modern high frequency markets as in Budish et al. (2015). Thus we hope to
bridge the gap between these two seminal papers.
Actually, there seems to be a growing interest in practice for trading outside standard CLOBs. For
example, a very important fraction of trading activity is still made over the counter and a rising
part of market participants turns to new forms of market structures such as dark pools or auctions.
Some auctions are already organized regularly in many markets where the main mechanism is a
CLOB, typically at the beginning and at the end of the trading day. There also exist auction
markets where auctions take place one after the other all along the day, and without continuous
trading phase between two auctions. During an auction, market participants can send and cancel
limit or market orders. Then at a certain time (possibly random), a clearing price is fixed in order
to maximize the exchanged volume and matched orders are executed at this price. This is for ex-
ample the case in the BATS-Cboe periodic auctions market for European equities. In this market,
auctions are triggered when a first order is sent (limit or market). Then settlement takes place at
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a random time such that the auction cannot last more than a pre-fixed duration (100 milliseconds)1.
In an auction context, the key issue for a regulator or an exchange is to set a proper time period for
the auction, and to compare the relevance of this mechanism with that of a CLOB. In Du and Zhu
(2017), the authors study the efficiency of an auction market with respect to the duration of the
auction. They propose a microscopic agent-based model with deterministic or stochastic arrival
of private and public information. Agents optimize their demand schedules with respect to their
information and some personal characteristics. The average utility over all agents is used as a cri-
terion to prove that the optimal auction duration is related to the law of exogenous information
arrival. The authors also study the impact of heterogenous speeds of agents. They show that
fast agents prefer short auction durations while slow ones prefer long ones. However, in the case
of heterogenous agents, they do not give any results on what the optimal auction duration should be.
Most other works on this topic use a price formation point of view to assess the quality of the spec-
ification of an auction. This is the case in Garbade and Silber (1979) where the authors propose a
simple model for price formation in an auction market. The average squared difference between an
efficient price and the clearing price is used as a metric to show that a positive optimal auction du-
ration always exists. The suggested optimal duration is a trade-off between averaging effect (a long
duration allows a large number of agents to take part in the auction, hence reducing uncertainty
about the efficient price) and volatility risk (a short duration leads to small volatility risk). This
model has been refined in Fricke and Gerig (2018). In this paper, the authors investigate several
generalizations of this framework such as the multi-assets case or the presence of a market maker us-
ing filtering techniques and observing correlated assets to infer the efficient price at the clearing time.
In our work, the same driving forces as in Fricke and Gerig (2018); Garbade and Silber (1979) will
be key to define our optimal durations: averaging effect versus volatility risk. However, an im-
portant limitation in Fricke and Gerig (2018); Garbade and Silber (1979) is that no market orders
are considered so that all the agents can be seen as liquidity providers. It is necessary to relax
this assumption since one observes a large part of market orders in the trading flows of actual
auctions, see Boussetta et al. (2017). For example, market participants having a marked to market
benchmark or seeking for priority in execution may typically use market orders. This type of orders
will have a crucial role when computing optimal auction durations. This is because long durations
induce large variance in the imbalance of the market order flow leading to less accurate fixing prices.
Another important remark is that in Du and Zhu (2017); Fricke and Gerig (2018); Garbade and Silber
(1979), no comparison between the auction and CLOB markets can be made. This is because the
CLOB structure is not included in the range of their models. They obtain optimal durations for
auction markets, but cannot say wether CLOB markets are sub-optimal or not. In our modeling,
1https://markets.cboe.com/europe/equities/trading/periodic auctions book
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CLOBs exactly correspond to auctions with duration equal to zero, making the comparison between
auctions and CLOBs possible.
In this paper, inspired by the cited earlier literature, we take price discovery as our criterion
to compute an optimal auction duration. Our approach extends in several directions those in
Fricke and Gerig (2018); Garbade and Silber (1979); Madhavan (1992) and goes as follows. We
consider a regenerative auction market with auctions starting when a market order is sent and with
constant duration h. More precisely, we assume that after the (i − 1)−th auction clearing (ended
at time τ cli−1) the limit order book is emptied and a new market phase starts independently of the
past. A new auction opens at time τ opi when a first market order is sent. This new auction ends
at time τ cli = τ
op
i + h. Our model encompasses both CLOB and auction market structures since
CLOB corresponds to an auction with duration 0 (because auctions are triggered by the arrival of
a market order, as in several actual markets, and we assume that the LOB is never empty at the
auction clearing).
In CLOB markets, there is competition between market makers optimizing their quotes and market
takers search for suitable execution times. In auction markets, market takers have an additional
possibility to access cheap liquidity: they can try to match their orders with other market orders
sent in the opposite direction. For example if a large volume of buy market orders is sent before
the auction clearing, it is a good opportunity for selling market takers to execute their orders at a
good price. In this context, a new form of competition between buying and selling market takers
may arise, with market makers playing a side role. We also investigate this situation where market
takers are strategic and act optimally in order to reduce their trading costs. We notably show that
there exists a Nash equilibrium for this game. In this framework, we can compute the function E
too, and thus find an optimal auction duration.
From a mathematical point of view, the existence of a Nash equilibrium boils down to solving a
fully coupled multi-dimensional BSDE driven by counting processes with non-positive discontinuous
generator. The existence of Nash equilibria associated to a system of BSDEs with discontinuous gen-
erator has been notably studied in Hamade`ne and Mu (2014) in a Brownian framework. BSDEs re-
lated to those in Hamade`ne and Mu (2014) have been essentially investigated in the one-dimensional
Brownian case (see for instance Jia (2008); Fan and Jiang (2012); Duan and Ren (2013); Tian et al.
(2013)) considering a semi-continuous generator with respect to the Y process and Lipschitz contin-
uous with respect to Z. Existence of solutions to these BSDEs can usually be obtained which is not
the case for uniqueness, see for instance (Jia, 2008, Remark 4). An extension to the multidimen-
sional case (still considering Lipschitz continuous generators with respect to Z) is proposed in Fan
(2018) together with a uniqueness result. In Heyne et al. (2014) the authors succeed in weakening
the continuity assumption with respect to the Z component and prove the existence and uniqueness
of a minimal solution in the one-dimensional case under positive generator or a relaxed condition,
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see (Heyne et al., 2014, Section 3.3). Up to our knowledge our existence result is new and extends
Hamade`ne and Mu (2014) to the case of counting processes. As explained above the question of
uniqueness is particularly intricate and out of the scope of this paper.
Finally, based on Euronext exchange data, we use our model to compute the optimal auction dura-
tion according to our price discovery criterion for 77 European stocks traded on Euronext. The first
striking result is that the suggested durations are much larger than a few milliseconds, rather of
order of 1 to 5 minutes. The second one is that in term of our metric, CLOB are indeed sub-optimal.
However, the quality of the price formation process in CLOB market is not very far from that of
the auction with optimal duration. Of course this work is only a first step towards a full analysis of
the auction issue since we focus here on one specific (but crucial) criterion. Other aspects such as
liquidity, tick size effects and fees or potential arbitrage opportunities should certainly be addressed
in future works. We also neglect potential optimization of market makers strategies who could for
example revise their quotes during the auction according to the current market orders imbalance.
Nevertheless, we believe our results are original and striking enough to help exchanges and financial
authorities rethink their policies in terms of market design.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the auction mechanism and our model.
We also provide our first main result on the computation of the function E. The case of strategic
market takers optimizing their trading cost is considered in Section 3. Our calibration methodology
and numerical results on equity data can be found in Section 4. Section 5 provides financial insights.
Proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The model
In this section, we introduce our model for auction market. We describe the organization of the
market and the behavior of the two types of agents: market makers filling the limit order book
(LOB) with limit orders and market takers sending market orders. Then we explain the clearing
rule and compute the clearing price. Finally we provide a semi-explicit expression for the quality
of the price formation process.
2.1 Auction market design
We consider an auction market organized in independent sequential auctions triggered by market
orders. More precisely, after the opening of the market or after the clearing of an auction, a new
auction starts when a first market order is sent. We write (τ opi )i∈N∗ for the sequence of opening
times of the auctions and (τ cli )i∈N, with τ
cl
0 = 0, for the sequence of clearing times. An auction has
a duration of h seconds and allows market takers to meet. When h = 0, our model corresponds to
a CLOB market since any market order is matched against the limit orders present in the LOB.
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For a given auction starting at some time τ opi , market participants can send market or limit orders.
At the auction clearing time τ cli = τ
op
i + h, a clearing price, denoted by P
cl
τcli
, is set to maximize
the exchanged volume. More precisely, sellers who are willing to sell below the price P cl
τcli
sell their
shares to buyers who are willing to buy above P cl
τcli
. Each cleared share is sold at the clearing price,
independently of the posted price of the associated limit order if any (to the benefit of participants
sending limit orders).
2.2 Market makers and market takers
Along the day, market makers arrive randomly in the market and send limit orders to fill the LOB.
During the i−th market phase market makers arrival times are given by (τ cli−1 + τ i,mmk )k≥0 where
τ i,mmk is the k−th event time of a counting process (N i,mms )s≥0. We describe the liquidity provided
by the k−th market maker by its supply function Sk. This supply function depends on the market
maker’s view on the efficient price at the clearing time when he sends his limit orders. The efficient
price process is (Ps)s≥0 and can be seen as the average of market makers’ opinions at a given time
on the “fair” value of the underlying asset. It satisfies Ps = P0+ σfWs with W a Brownian motion
and σf a positive constant. When positive, the quantity Sk(p) represents the number of shares the
k−th market maker is willing to sell at price p or above. Negative values correspond to shares he
is willing to buy at price p or below. We assume that
Sk(p) = K(p− P˜k), with P˜k = E[Pτcli |Fτcli−1+τ i,mmk ] + gk,
where P˜k is the view on the price of the asset by the k−th market maker when he sends his orders
andK a positive constant, (gk)k>0 a sequence of i.i.d random variables with variance σ
2 representing
the estimation noise in the inference of the efficient price by the market maker independent of all
other processes. Linear supply functions are also considered in Du and Zhu (2017); Fricke and Gerig
(2018). This is equivalent to assume that each market maker sends uniform limit sell order above
price P˜k and uniform limit buy orders to price level below P˜k. In this case we get
P˜k = Pτcli−1+τ
i,mm
k
+ gk.
In practice there are different kinds of market makers and we could have assumed that each market
maker has its own noise. That said, there are typically not so many market makers in the market
and since they basically have the same technology, it is reasonable to assume that they have the
same noise parameter. Note also that a model with different variance parameters would be very
hard to calibrate because of the anonymity of our data.
Consequently, market makers inject information in the LOB since they reveal the knowledge they
have on the price through their supply function. However, the longer the auction duration, the less
reliable the views of market makers arrived early in term of the estimation of the efficient price P
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at the clearing time23. Finally to obtain a regenerative market we consider that after the auction
clearing time τ cli market makers cancel their unmatched limit orders. Since sequential auctions mar-
kets with sufficiently large durations do not really exist, it is hard to have an idea of what would
be the market maker’s behavior. Of course, total cancellation after the clearing is not so realistic.
However, note that the times of interest of our analysis are the auctions closing times, where the
model is very reasonable. For example, when h = 0, which corresponds to a CLOB market, at each
time a market order is sent, the LOB is already filled thanks to Assumption 2 below. By setting
∆i = τ
cl
i − τ cli−1 we deduce that at the clearing there is N i,mm∆i market makers in the LOB.
During the i−th market phase the arrival time of the k−th buy (resp. sell) market order is given by
τ cli−1+τ
i,a
k (resp. τ
i,b
k ) where τ
i,a
k (resp. τ
i,b
k ) is the k−th event time of the counting process (N i,as )s≥0
(resp. (N i,bs )s≥0). Consequently the opening time of the i−th auction is τ opi = τ cli−1+ τ i,a1 ∧ τ i,b1 . We
suppose that each market taker sends market orders with constant volume v. Moreover we assume
that (N i,mm, N i,a, N i,b) is independent of the efficient price P . We define Ii as the cumulated im-
balance of the market takers: Iit = vN
i,a
t − vN i,bt . The aggregated demand of the market takers at
the clearing of the i−th auction is thus given by Ii∆i .
We now make the following natural assumption, which states that market is regenerative.
Assumption 1. The market dynamics satisfy:
i) After each auction clearing the market regenerates: the processes (N i,mm, N i,a, N i,b, Ii)i≥0 are
independent and identically distributed.
ii) The random variables (τ i,a1 ∧ τ i,b1 )i≥0 are i.i.d. with exponential law with parameter ν.
iii) The random variables N1,a
τcl1
and N1,b
τcl1
are squared integrable.
Points i) and ii) of Assumption 1 imply that market order flow is basically a Poisson process, which
is the most standard dynamic used in the microstructure literature, see Avellaneda and Stoikov
(2008); Gue´ant (2017). This assumption is not perfectly realistic, in particular it does not enable
us to reproduce the long memory property of market order flow, see for example Bouchaud et al.
(2009). A possible way to relax this assumption would be to consider Hawkes-type intensities.
However this would make the model much more intricate in terms of computation and calibration.
Point iii) is a classical technical assumption.
Note that Points i) and ii) of Assumption 1 mean that for any i ≥ 0, τ opi+1−τ cli follows an exponential
random variable with parameter ν. We also consider (Nmm, Na, N b, I) a random variable with the
2To partially address this issue we extend our model allowing market makers to revise their position by canceling
their orders in Appendix D.
3Note that a possible extension would be to consider that P˜k also depends on recently observed clearing prices,
see Fricke and Gerig (2018).
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law of (N1,mm, N1,a, N1,b, I1). This will be useful to lighten some notations.
In practice it is very unlikely that a market taker sends a market order if there is no liquidity in
the LOB and a situation with empty LOB is very unrealistic. A way to adapt the non empty
LOB assumption setting is to consider that the first market maker always arrives before the auction
clearing occurs. It means that almost surely for any i we have τ i,mm1 < (τ
i,a
1 ∧ τ i,b1 ) + h. Hence we
consider the following assumption
Assumption 2. Let µ > 0. The density of
(
τ1,mm1 , (τ
1,a
1 ∧ τ1,b1 )
)
at point (s, t) ∈ R2 is given by
10≤s≤t+h
µe−µs
1− e−µ(t+h)ds νe
−νt1t≥0dt.
Finally we assume that (N1,mm
s+τ1,mm1
−1)0≤s≤h is a Poisson process with intensity µ that is independent
of P and (N1,as , N
1,b
s )s≥τ1,mm1
.
Assumption 2 means that (N1,mms )0≤s≤τop1 +h has the law of a Poisson process with intensity µ
conditional on the fact that its first event occurs before time τ cl1 . This assumption
4 also allows to
obtain a non-degenerate CLOB at the limit h = 0.
2.3 Clearing rule
We now explain how the clearing price is settled at the end of an auction. At time τ cli = τ
op
i + h, a
clearing price P cl
τcli
is set in order to maximize the exchanged volume. This clearing rule is used in
most of electronic markets for the opening and clearing auctions. This is also the rule considered in
the academic literature (see for instance Du and Zhu (2017)). We denote by F−(p) (resp. F+(p))
the total number of shares that buyers (resp. sellers) are willing to buy (resp. sell) at price p.
The function F− (resp. F+) is decreasing (resp. increasing). Assume that a clearing price P cl is
set. The total volume exchanged is then F−(P cl) ∧ F+(P cl). Now suppose that F− and F+ are
continuous at point P cl and F−(P cl) < F+(P cl). If there is still remaining liquidity on the bid side
of the book (formally if F− is not bounded by F−(P cl)), the exchanged volume is not optimal as it
may be improved by decreasing the price. Conversely, assume that F−(P cl) > F+(P cl) and if there
is liquidity on the ask side (formally, if F+ is not bounded by F+(P cl)), then the exchanged volume
is not optimal as it may be improved by increasing the price. Thus, when such equality is possible
and in order to maximize volume at the clearing time, the optimal clearing price has to satisfied
F−(P cl)− F+(P cl) = 0. (1)
Note that the value F−(+∞) (resp. F+(−∞)) is the number of shares to be bought (resp. to be
sold) at any price.
4An alternative idea leading to a very different approach would be to endogenize the market behavior of market
makers, see Du and Zhu (2017)
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The function F− − F+ is the algebraic supply-demand function of all market participants together
(market makers and market takers). Thus we have obtained that the clearing price is a zero of the
aggregated supply-demand of the agents. Consequently, in our framework, the clearing price P cl
τcli
of the i− th auction, defined as a solution of (1), can be found solving the following equation:
N
i,mm
∆i∑
k=1
Sk(p)− Ii∆i = 0.
The i−th clearing price is then given by
P cl
τcli
=
1
N i,mm∆i
N
i,mm
∆i∑
k=1
P˜k +
1
K
Ii∆i
N i,mm∆i
. (2)
Finally, we define the mid-price Pmid of the LOB as the obtained clearing price without taking into
account market orders in the auction clearing:
Pmid
τcli
=
1
N i,mm∆i
N
i,mm
∆i∑
k=1
P˜k. (3)
2.4 A metric for the quality of the price formation process
One of the main roles of a financial market is to reveal with accuracy the price of the underlying asset,
guaranteeing fair transaction prices to market participants. In our framework, this is equivalent to
have a clearing price close to the efficient price. Therefore a natural criterion to compare different
auction durations is to assess, with respect to the auctions duration, the accumulated error between
the efficient price and the clearing prices over the day. To do so, we consider the following time-
weighted quadratic error:
Zht =
Nclt −1∑
i=1
∆i+1(Pτcli
− P cl
τcl
i
)2 + (t− τ cl
Nclt
)(Pτcl
Ncl
t
− P cl
τcl
Ncl
t
)2, (4)
where N clt denotes the number of auctions cleared before time t. Thus, for each auction, we consider
the quadratic deviation between the clearing price and the efficient price and weight this deviation
by the time to wait until a new price is set. Note that (4) may be rewritten
Zht =
∫ t
0
(P
cl
s − P s)2ds,
where the processes P
cl
s and P s are respectively the clearing and efficient price at the last auction
clearing time before time s, that is
(P
cl
s , P s) = (P
cl
τcli
, Pτcli
), where i = sup{j ≥ 1, s.t τ clj ≤ s}.
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We define an auction duration h∗ as optimal if almost surely, Zh
∗
t is asymptotically smaller than
Zht for any h ≥ 0. Using the fact that
(
(P
cl
s − P s)2
)
s≥0
is a regenerative process we obtain, see
Appendix E, the following important result for our asymptotic computations.
Lemma 2.1. The following convergence holds almost surely:
lim
t→+∞
Zht
t
= E[(P cl
τcl1
− Pτcl1 )
2].
In light of Lemma 2.1, a duration h∗ is optimal if it is a minimizer of the function E given by
E(h) = E[(P cl
τcl1
− Pτcl1 )
2].
We also consider the efficiency of the mid-price defined in (3), denoted by Emid:
Emid(h) = E[(Pmid
τ
op
1 +h
− Pτop1 +h)
2].
We now give our first main theorem. It provides a semi-explicit expression for the function E. Its
proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 2.1. The quality of price formation process metric satisfies:
E(h) = Emid(h) +
E[I2
τcl1
]
K2
(1− e−µh ν
ν + µ
)−1eνh
∫ +∞
h
νe−νte−µt
∫ µt
0
1
s
∫ s
0
eu − 1
u
dudsdt,
with Emid(h) given by
(1− e−µh ν
ν + µ
)−1eνh
∫ +∞
h
νe−νt
(
(σ2f
t
6
+ σ2)e−µt
∫ µt
0
es − 1
s
ds+ σ2f
t
3
(1− e−µt)
)
dt. (5)
Remark 2.1. Note that we can simplify the double integrals by using the so-called Exponential
Integral function E1 : R
∗
+ −→ R+ defined by E1(x) =
∫ +∞
x
e−u
u
du. We thus get
E(h) = Emid(h)+
E[I2
τcl1
]
K2
(1− e−µh ν
ν + µ
)−1eνh
( ∫ +∞
h
e−µu−1
u
ν
ν + µ
E1
(
(ν + µ)u
)
du
+
∫ h
0
e−µu−1
u
ν
ν + µ
(
log(
h
u
)e−(ν+µ)h + E1((ν + µ)h)
)
du
)
,
where Emid is given by (5).
We remark from Theorem 2.1 that for given h > 0, E(h) > Emid(h). This is quite intuitive: the
presence of market orders induces here additional deviations of clearing prices which are not directly
driven by information, rather by imbalance between supply and demand. Of course when µ = 0,
we get E(h) = Emid(h). We also see that the price formation process is of higher quality when K is
large. In that case a large amount of liquidity is already present close to the efficient price, leading
to better transaction prices. Finally note that a similar expression as the one in Theorem 2.1 can
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be obtained when we allow market makers to cancel their orders, see Appendix D.
If we have access to the quantity E[I2
τ
op
1 +h
], which depends on the market takers behavior, Theorem
2.1 enables us to compute the function E and therefore to find the optimal auction duration by
minimizing E. We can for example consider the standard assumption that Na and N b are indepen-
dent Poisson processes with intensity ν/2 along the auction (this is consistent with Assumption 1).
In this case we get
E[I2
τ
op
1 +h
] = v2(νh+ 1),
see Appendix B. Therefore the function h → E(h) of Theorem 2.1 becomes fully explicit and we
can obtain numerically the optimal duration. We refer to Section 4 for numerical details, empirical
results and statistical methodology to estimate the parameters appearing in the expression of E(h).
The Poisson assumption for the market order flow is very classical and leads to easy computations
and simple results. However, in an auction setting, market orders play a crucial role and one should
also investigate the possibility of strategic placements, taking into account the auction environment.
We deal with this situation in the next section.
3 Strategic market takers
In practice, market orders are sent through algorithms optimizing transaction times. So, in this
section, we consider that market takers aim at minimizing their trading costs by adapting their
trading intensities to the market state. We formalize this into a competitive game between buying
and selling market takers. We show that this game admits a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, when
market takers follow the strategies corresponding to this Nash equilibrium, we can compute the key
quantity E[I2
τ
op
1 +h
] appearing in the expression of E(h). Note that it would of course be interesting
to also consider that market makers are also strategic alter their behaviors in response to changing
duration of the auction, see Budish et al. (2015); Du and Zhu (2017). However we left this case
for further research and focus here on the specific feature of auction markets from a market taker
viewpoint.
3.1 Trading costs of market takers
We model the aggregated group of buying (resp. selling) market takers as a single player called
Player a (resp. b). During the auctions, Player a (resp. b) controls the intensity λa (resp. λb) of the
arrival process Na (resp. N b), wishing to get minimal costs. In practice, market orders are often
send to execute large metaorders over a specified time-interval. Consequently, whatever the market
design, market takers are usually required to buy or sell a certain volume on a given period. To
reproduce the fact that market takers intensities can neither be too high nor too low, we assume
that λa and λb are bounded from above and below by two positive constants λ+ and λ−.
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The aggregated total trading cost at time t of buying market takers, denoted by Cat , satisfies
Cat =
Nclt∑
i=1
N i,a∆i (P
cl
τcli
− Pτcli ).
From Theorem 3.1 in Chap VI in Asmussen (2008) together with the fact that the market is
regenerative we obtain the following lemma on the asymptotic behavior of the trading costs.
Lemma 3.1. We have the following almost sure convergence:
lim
t→+∞
Cat
t
= E[Na
τcl1
(P cl
τcl1
− Pτcl1 )]
ν
1 + νh
.
Therefore, in the long run, the average trading cost of buying market takers is a multiple of
E[Na
τcl1
(P cl
τcl1
− Pτcl1 )] =
v
K
E[
1
Nmm∆i
]E[Na
τcl1
(Na
τcl1
−N b
τcl1
)].
Now writing Na
τcl1
= Na
τ
op
1 +h
− Na
τ
op
1
+ Na
τ
op
1
and using the fact that Na
τ
op
1
is either equal to one or
zero, solving the problem of Player a is equivalent to be able to minimize
E[Nah(N
a
h −N bh)]
when (Na0 , N
b
0) = (1, 0) and when (N
a
0 , N
b
0) = (0, 1). Consequently, for any (α, β) ∈ N2, we consider
the more general problem for Player a minimizing
E[Nah(N
a
h −N bh)|(Na0 , N b0) = (α, β)].
In the same way, Player b minimizes E[N bh(N
b
h − Nah)|(Na0 , N b0) = (α, β)] . Each player aims at
deriving its own trading intensity which will lead to the smallest possible trading costs for him.
Note that in our setting, Assumption 1 implies that market takers reset their strategies at the
beginning of each auction. We could have considered the case where market takers optimize their
behavior all along the day. However, since we are interested in the effects of auction durations in a
stationary context, our framework remains reasonable.
3.2 Nash equilibrium
We now give our result on the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this game of competing market
takers. We consider that market takers control their trading intensities. The set of admissible
controls is denoted by U and defined as the set of F− predictable processes with values in [λ−, λ+]
for fixed 0 < λ− ≤ λ+. Any couple of strategies (λa, λb) ∈ U2 of Player a and b induces a probability
measure Pλa,λb such that
Na· −
∫ ·
0
λasds and N
b
· −
∫ ·
0
λbsds
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are martingales under Pλa,λb . In order to minimize its costs, Player a solves
inf
λa∈U
V a,α,βh (λa, λb), (6)
with V a,α,βh (λa, λb) = E
P
λa,λb [Nah (N
a
h − N bh)|(Na0 , N b0) = (α, β)], for fixed λb chosen by the selling
market taker, Player b. Symmetrically, Player b solves
inf
λb∈U
V b,α,βh (λa, λb), (7)
with V b,α,βh (λa, λb) = E
P
λa,λb [N bh(N
b
h − Nah )|(Na0 , N b0) = (α, β)] for fixed λa chosen by the buying
market taker, Player a. A Nash equilibrium is obtained if the two optimization problems (6) and
(7) can be addressed simultaneously.
Note that this framework is realistic regarding the information observable by market takers. Indeed
we only assume that market takers observe market orders imbalance. This information is for ex-
ample available on the Euronext platform for the opening and closing auctions and on the auctions
market of BATS-Cboe.
We prove that this game indeed admits a (non-necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium with corre-
sponding optimal controls (λ⋆a, λ
⋆
b). More precisely using these notations we have the following
result.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a Nash equilibrium to the simultaneous optimization problem (6)-(7)
given by some Markovian controls5 (λ⋆a, λ
⋆
b) satisfying
inf
λa∈U
V a,α,βh (λa, λ
⋆
b) = E
P
λ⋆a,λ
⋆
b [Nah (N
a
h −N bh)|(Na0 , N b0) = (α, β)]
and
inf
λb∈U
V b,α,βh (λ
⋆
a, λb) = E
P
λ⋆a,λ
⋆
b [N bh(N
b
h −Nah )|(Na0 , N b0) = (α, β)].
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is provided in Appendix C. The HJB equation related to the optimization
problem is somehow degenerated. This prevents us from using classical arguments to obtain a
solution. In order to give intuition about it we give here a short sketch of the proof.
Step 0. We first consider a smoothed version of the HJB equation associated with our problem. Hence,
the proof of Theorem 3.1 is reduced to the existence and then convergence of the solutions of
a (smooth) system of HJB equations (see Theorem C.1).
Step 1. We consider the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE for short) associated to the
smoothed HJB equation. The existence of a Nash equilibrium is then related to the existence
of a solution to this (Lipschitz) BSDE.
5The notion of Markovian control has to be understood in the sense of (Carmona and Delarue, 2018, Definition
2.10)
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Step 2. We prove that the sequence of BSDEs converges in suitable spaces towards a solution of a
degenerate BSDE.
Step 3. We conclude by showing that the solution we obtain at the limit corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium of the competition between market takers.
Note that we do not get uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, only the existence. Since the gener-
ator of the BSDE associated to this problem has discontinuities there is almost no chance that a
uniqueness result can be found by classical methods. Moreover, even if the method used give unique-
ness of the limit Nash equilibrium, this limit will be strongly dependent of the smoothing procedure.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 also provides a numerical method to approximate V a,1,0h (λ
⋆
a, λ
⋆
b) and
V b,1,0h (λ
⋆
a, λ
⋆
b) using solutions of some integro-differential equations, see Appendix C.3. It is partic-
ularly important since it enables us to compute optimal auction durations when market takers are
playing the Nash equilibrium. This is because the function E of Theorem 2.1 explicitly depends on
V a,1,0h (λ
⋆
a, λ
⋆
b) and V
b,1,0
h (λ
⋆
a, λ
⋆
b), as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. Under the Nash equilibrium (λ⋆a, λ
⋆
b), we have
E[I2
τ
op
1 +h
] = V a,1,0h (λ
⋆
a, λ
⋆
b) + V
b,1,0
h (λ
⋆
a, λ
⋆
b).
4 Optimal auction durations for some European stocks
We give here the results obtained on real data when applying our methodology to derive optimal
auction durations. We consider both situations of non-strategic and strategic market takers and
compare with the CLOB case.
4.1 Description of the data
We have access to intra-day market data for 77 of the most liquid stocks traded on Euronext
exchange, for all trading days of September 2018. For each stock, every trade is reported with the
following information:
• Timestamp of the trade.
• Traded volume.
• Execution price.
• Best bid and ask prices just before the transaction.
• Volumes at best bid and best ask just before the transaction.
We discard from our study trades related to 1% upper and lower quantiles in term of volume in
order to remove some outliers.
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4.2 Calibration of model parameters
Our market data are CLOB data and not auction data. Still, we are able to calibrate the parameters
of our model as explained below.
4.2.1 Market takers parameters
The behavior of market takers is characterized by three parameters:
• Their intensity of arrival between two auctions ν.
• The volume of market orders v.
• The upper and lower bounds for their trading intensity λ− and λ+.
CLOB corresponds to the case where auctions last zero second. Consequently, in our framework, the
market order flow in a CLOB market is given by two Poisson processes Na and N b with intensity ν.
Thus we estimate ν by the average number of market orders per day divided by the duration of a
trading day and v by the average volume of a market order. Finally we set λ+ = 2ν and λ− = ν/4.
This choice seems reasonable since the market order flow should have similar order of magnitude
irrespectively of the market design so that agents can complete execution of their metaorders.
4.2.2 Market makers parameters and calibration of price volatility
The behavior of market makers is characterized by three parameters:
• The variance σ of the (gi)i≥0. We assume that σ is equal to the implicit spread of the asset
that we estimate from the uncertainty zones model of Dayri and Rosenbaum (2015).
• The intensity of market makers arrivals µ.
• The slope of their supply function K.
Let α be the tick value of the asset. According to our model, in the CLOB case, the average volume
available in the first limit of the LOB when a market taker arrives, denoted by e, satisfies
e = KαE[Nmm
τ
op
1
] = Kα
ν + µ
ν
and the average squared volume of the first limit, denoted by ς, satisfies
ς = K2α2E[(Nmm
τ
op
1
)2] = K2α2
ν + µ
ν
(1 + 2
µ
ν
).
Those results are a direct consequence of Assumption 2 and of some computations. Consequently
we have
K = (2e− ς
e
)α−1 and µ = ν(
e
αK
− 1).
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So we can estimate µ and K from empirical measurements of e and ς. Finally, we estimate the
volatility σf of the efficient price from the five minutes sampling based realized volatility of the
traded price.
4.3 Numerical results
Using our approach, we provide in Table 1 and 2 the optimal auction durations for 77 stocks traded
on Euronext. We give the results when assuming Poisson arrivals for the market takers and when
considering they optimize their trading costs, leading to a Nash equilibrium (see Appendix C.3 for
numerical aspects in this case).
The first column is the stock name. In the Poisson (resp. Nash) case, the second (resp. fourth)
column is the optimal duration in seconds. The third (resp. fourth) one is the relative difference of
quality of the price formation process between the optimal duration case and the CLOB situation:
(E(0) − E(h∗))/E(h∗). In the optimal durations columns we provide estimated optimal durations
together with 90% confidence interval (with respect to the estimated value for the parameter ν).
The optimal duration range is essentially between 0 and 10 minutes and our results are very robust
to the parameter ν. For all the assets such that the optimal auction duration for Poisson market
takers is positive, the optimal duration in the Nash case is smaller. Some assets have the CLOB
structure as optimal in the Poisson case. However, when considering the Nash case, CLOB be-
come always suboptimal. We also remark that no straightforward structural explanation (sector,
capitalization, ...) seems to explain the difference in optimal duration between assets. Finding
microstructural foundations for these results is left for further work.
As explained in Section 3, we constrain market takers trading intensities to the range [λ−, λ+].
From numerical experiments, by testing several ranges of controls [λ−, λ+], we have observed that
the optimal duration is quite robust to those parameters. Still we remark the following sensitivities:
if we allow for a smaller λ− without modifying λ+, the optimal auction duration becomes larger.
This is because having a small λ− means that market takers can send less market orders when the
situation is not in their favor. This implies that E[I2τop+h] increases slowlier with h. This moves the
minimum of E to a higher level. For symmetric reasons, if we raise λ+ without changing λ−, the
optimal auction duration becomes smaller.
We notice that CLOBs are sometimes optimal in the Poisson case. When they are not, the difference
in the values of the metric for h = 0 and h = h∗ is typically not very large. Therefore even though
CLOB markets are usually sub-optimal, they are in general leading to a fairly satisfactory market
microstructure. On BATS-Cboe the auction duration is approximately 100ms which is very small
compared to the typical optimal auction durations we find. Moreover according to the empirical
study Besson et al. (2019), there is essentially only one market order involved in each auction. This
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DurationPoisson DiffrelPoisson DurationNash DiffrelNash
Bouygues 228 [226;230] 1% 152 [150;153] 20%
Arkema 397 [392;400] 23 % 268 [265; 272] 19 %
Michelin 1053 [1046;1060] 60% 763 [757;768] 89%
Eurofins Scient. 761 [749;773] 18% 554 [546;563] 37%
Engie 866 [857;875] 104% 866 [857;875] 158%
Stmicroelectronics 177 [176;179] 2% 123 [122;124] 21%
Alstom 0 [0;0] 0% 180 [178;181] 14%
Legrand SA 325 [322;329] 0% 216 [214;221] 19%
Eiffage 0 [0;0] 0% 149 [147;150] 12%
Eramet 1086 [1074;1098] 30% 812 [803;822] 50%
SES Sa 0 [0;0] 0% 81 [80;83] 6%
Pernod Ricard 427 [423;430] 22% 301 [298;304] 45%
Iliad 163 [162;164] 0% 109 [108;110] 18%
Faurecia 0 [0;0] 0% 36 [35;37] 4%
Orange 382 [379;385] 21% 274 [273.6;278] 42%
Sodexo 0 [0;0] 0% 49 [51;47] 1%
Air France - KLM 295 [292;297] 17% 218 [216;220] 35%
Teleperformance 1241 [1224;1259] 27 % 881 [868;894] 50 %
Hermes 295 [292;298] 1% 205 [203;207] 19%
Eutelsat Com. 0 [0; 0] 0 % 40 [39; 42] 2 %
Nexans 487 [480;494] 8% 360 [356;365] 23%
Ingenico Group 0 [0;0] 0% 143 [142;144] 15%
Unibail - Wfd Unibai 187 [186;188] 19% 142 [141;143] 36%
Plastic Omnium 0 [0;0] 0% 176.5 [176.3;176.8] 9%
Veolia Environ. 350 [346;353] 3% 253 [251;256] 21%
Schneider Electric 246 [245;248] 39% 171 [170;172] 65%
Peugeot 386 [383;389] 10% 282 [280;285] 29%
Vinci 350 [348;353] 39% 252 [250;253] 64%
CGG 837 [827;847] 15% 605 [597;613] 36%
Atos 962 [954;969] 66% 700 [694;706] 95%
Suez Environnement 0 [0;0] 0% 311 [308;315] 14%
Danone 204 [203;206] 15% 146 [145;147] 35%
Kering 133 [132;134] 19% 93.4 [93.1;94] 42%
Table 1: Optimal auction durations (in seconds) Part 1 with a 90% confidence interval.
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DurationPoisson DiffrelPoisson DurationNash DiffrelNash
EssilorLuxottica 342 [339;345] 30% 238 [236;240] 55%
Lagardere 0 [0;0] 0 % 42 [39; 44] 3 %
Credit Agricole 87.7 [87.2;88.5] 2% 58.6 [58;59.4] 22%
CapGemini 502 [497;508] 20% 354 [350;358] 43%
Lvmh 121 [120;122] 6% 87.3 [87;88] 25%
Valeo 0 [0;0] 0% 98 [97;98.2] 16%
Air Liquide 627 [622;632] 35% 459 [456;463] 58%
Total 359 [357;360] 60% 261 [260;263] 89%
Vivendi 1023 [1014;1031] 42% 750 [743;756] 67%
Casino Guichard 158 [157;159] 15% 119 [118;120] 28%
Societe Generale 104 [104;105] 18% 74.1 [74;74.3] 40%
Klepierre 0 [0;0] 0% 219 [217;221] 14%
Publicis Groupe 601 [595;606] 32% 428 [424;432] 56%
Sanofi 124 [123;124] 12% 88.2 [88;89] 32%
Thales 644 [637;652] 23% 454 [449;460] 46%
TechnipFMC 331 [327;334] 7% 234 [232;236] 27%
Bnp Paribas 104.3 [104.2;104.8] 18% 73.4 [73.2;74] 41%
Safran 0 [0;0] 0% 107 [106;108] 16%
Saint Gobain 0 [0;0] 0% 58.2 [58;59] 11%
Orpea 834 [822;846] 29% 578 [569;587] 55%
Carrefour 410 [407;413] 34% 293 [291;295] 58%
Ipsen 827 [817;838] 65% 551 [544;559] 101%
Natixis 351 [348;354] 9% 253 [251;255] 28%
EDF 341 [338;344] 15% 246 [244;248] 35%
Axa 252 [251;254] 36% 182 [181;183] 60%
Dassault Systemes 316 [312;319] 7% 222 [220;224] 27%
Accor Hotels 0 [0;0] 0% 105.3 [105.8;104.7] 6%
Airbus 210 [209;211] 34% 146 [145;147] 60%
Ubi Soft Entertain 0 [0;0] 0% 43.4 [43;44] 1%
Renault 0 [0;0] 0% 41.7 [41;42.2] 3%
Solvay 528 [522;534] 11% 375 [371;380] 32%
Edenred 313 [309;316] 8% 210 [208;212] 29%
Table 2: Optimal auction durations (in seconds) Part 2 with a 90% confidence interval.
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means that the duration of auctions chosen by BATS-Cboe does not allow buyers and sellers market
takers to match their orders, to the profit of market makers. Indeed a larger auction duration may
lead to smaller gains for market makers. For example if market takers always match their orders
with other market takers, market makers never collect the spread. Hence it is possible that BATS-
Cboe chose this short duration in order to keep its platform attractive for market makers, which
guarantee its liquidity. This is actually another possible point of view on this problematic that
we have not considered in this paper. It is also likely that exchanges may be reluctant to change
drastically their market design so that clients are not too surprised. This could also explain why
they decided to move only slightly from the CLOB system.
5 Policy implications and financial insights
The main take away of our analysis is that one size does not fit all : first in the spirit of Budish et al.
(2015) we confirm that the nowadays almost universal CLOB mechanism (for liquid assets) may
be suboptimal. We indeed show that auctions are quite often preferable in term of market quality.
Second, the auction duration has to depend on some fundamental parameters of the considered asset
(such as liquidity and volatility). Our work also underlines the crucial need of thorough quantitative
analysis as a preliminary task to market structure modification. Here such an analysis enables us to
compute optimal frequencies for auctions. We find that they are diverse but that reasonable order of
magnitude is of a few minutes, which is probably fast enough for large investors. This is in contrast
with the intuitive idea that in fast electronic markets auction frequency should be necessarily very
high. Such a result is due to the fact that our criterion aims at finding the best price discovery
mechanism and therefore we somehow take the investor point of view. Doing so, our philosophy is
to build volume rather than speed driven market. This pushes forward the idea of a debate between
exchanges and the various market participants in order to revisit market microstructure.
Note that in the CLOB case, usual parameters that the exchange can adjust to improve market
microstructure are tick sizes and make-take fees. Given the order of magnitude of the auctions
durations we find, the tick size will probably play a minor role in the market dynamics. However,
the effects of a make-take fees schedule are yet to be investigated, as well as the impact of auctions
in a situation with multiple competing exchanges.
We insist on the fact that our results do not advocate for the disappearance of CLOB markets. We
indeed show that they are optimal for some assets and often not so far from optimality in terms of
market quality. Going further in the idea that one size does not fit all, we could think of alternating
periods of CLOB and auction market within the same trading day. We currently investigate the
relevance of such mechanism as a natural next step to the present paper.
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A Proof of Theorem 2.1
We are reduced to compute :
E(h) = E[(Pτcl1
− P cl
τcl1
)2|Ω˜]
When Nmm be a Poisson process with intensity µ and Ω˜ = {Nmm
τcl1
> 0}. We are reduced to compute
E(h) = E[(Pτcl1
− P cl
τcl1
)2|Ω].
Thus, recalling that τ op1 + h = τ
cl
1 , we get
E(h) = E
[(Nmmτcl1∑
k=1
Pτmm
k
− Pτcl1
Nmm
τcl1
)2∣∣Ω˜]+ E[(
Nmm
τcl
1∑
k=1
gk
Nmm
τcl1
)2∣∣Ω˜]+ 1
K2
E
[ I2
τcl1
Nmm
τcl1
2
∣∣Ω˜]
= P(Nmm
τcl1
> 0)−1
(
E
[
1Nmm
τcl
1
>0
{(Nmmτcl1∑
k=1
Pτmm
k
− Pτcl1
Nmm
τcl1
)2
+
(Nmmτcl1∑
k=1
gk
Nmm
τcl1
)2
+
1
K2
I2
τcl1
Nmm
τcl1
2
}])
= P(Nmm
τcl1
> 0)−1eνh
∫ +∞
h
νe−νt
(
g(t) + σ2f(t) +
1
K2
ℓ(t)
)
dt (8)
with
g(t) = E[1Nmmt >0(
Nmmt∑
k=1
Pτmm
k
− Pt
Nmmt
)2], f(t) = E[
1Nmmt >0
Nmmt
], and ℓ(t) = E[I2
τcl1
]E[
1Nmmt >0
Nmmt
2 ].
A direct computation gives
P(Nmm
τcl1
> 0) = 1− e−µh ν
ν + µ
. (9)
We now turn to the computation of the function g. We have the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. We have for any t > 0
g(t) = σ2f
t2
2
µE[
1
(Nmmt + 1)
2
] + σ2f
t3
3
µ2E[
1
(Nmmt + 2)
2
]. (10)
Proof. Note that
g(t) = σ2fE
[
1Nmmt >0
Nmmt∑
k=1
( Wτmm
k
−Wt
Nmmt − 1 + 1
)2]
+ σ2fE
[
1Nmmt >0
Nmmt∑
k,l=1 s.t. k 6=l
(Wτmm
k
−Wt)(Wτmm
l
−Wt)
(Nmmt − 2 + 2)2
]
.
Consider Xt the Poisson scatter made of the event times of N
mm between time 0 and t. Then we
have
g(t) = σ2fE
[ ∑
x∈Xt
(Wx −Wt)2
(#{Xt\{x}} + 1)2
]
+ σ2fE
[ ∑
x,y∈Xt s.t. x 6=y
(Wx −Wt)(Wy −Wt)
(#{Xt\{x, y}}+ 2)2
]
.
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Since Pt = σfWt is independent of N
mm, we get
g(t) = σ2fE
[ ∑
x∈Xt
(t− x)2
(#{Xt\{x}} + 1)2
]
+ σ2fE
[ ∑
x,y∈Xt s.t. x 6=y
(t− x) ∧ (t− y)
(#{Xt\{x, y}}+ 2)2
]
.
Finally using Palm’s Formula, see for example Coeurjolly et al. (2017), we get
g(t) = σ2fE
[ 1
(Nmmt + 1)
2
] ∫ t
0
(t− u)µdu+ σ2fE
[ 1
(Nmmt + 2)
2
] ∫ t
0
∫ t
0
(t− u) ∧ (t− v)µ2dudv,
and (10) follows.
To compute explicitly f , ℓ and g from Lemma A.1, we need the following additional results.
Lemma A.2. Let N be a general inhomogeneous Poisson process with intensity measure λ. The
following equalities hold:
E[
1Nt>0
Nt
] = e−mt
∫ mt
0
es − 1
s
ds, and E[
1Nt>0
N2t
] = e−mt
∫ mt
0
1
s
∫ s
0
eu − 1
u
duds, (11)
E[
1
(1 +Nt)2
] =
e−mt
mt
∫ mt
0
es − 1
s
ds, and E[
1
(2 +Nt)2
] =
1
m2t
(
1− e−mt − e−mt
∫ mt
0
es − 1
s
ds
)
,
(12)
with mt =
∫ t
0 λ(ds).
Proof of (11). Note that
E[
1Nt>0
Nt
] =
+∞∑
n=1
1
n
mnt
n!
e−mt and E[
1Nt>0
N2t
] =
+∞∑
n=1
1
n2
mnt
n!
e−mt .
The functions e1 and e2 defined by
e1(x) =
+∞∑
n=1
1
n
xn
n!
and e2(x) =
+∞∑
n=1
1
n2
xn
n!
are continuously differentiable function, so that
e′1(x) =
+∞∑
n=1
xn−1
n!
=
ex − 1
x
and xe′2(x) =
+∞∑
n=1
1
n
xn
n!
= e1(x).
By integrating these functions, we get (11).
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Proof of (12). Note that
E[
1
(1 +Nt)2
] =
+∞∑
n=0
1
(1 + n)2
mnt
n!
e−mt and E[
1
(2 +Nt)2
] =
+∞∑
n=0
1
(2 + n)2
mnt
n!
e−mt .
Consider, for i > 0, the functions
ri(x) =
+∞∑
n=0
1
(i+ n)2
xn+i
n!
and si(x) =
+∞∑
n=0
1
i+ n
xn+i
n!
.
We have
r′i(x) =
+∞∑
n=0
1
i+ n
xn+i−1
n!
hence ri(x) =
∫ x
0
si(s)
s
ds.
Since
s′i(x) =
+∞∑
n=0
xn+i−1
n!
= xi−1ex we get ri(x) =
∫ x
0
1
s
∫ s
0
ui−1eududs.
Taking i = 1 and i = 2 we get (12).
Injecting Equations (11) and (9) into f and ℓ and Equation (12) into g in view of (10), using (8)
we obtain the formulas stated in Theorem 2.1.
B Computation of the expected square imbalance in the Poisson
case
We want to compute E[I2
τ
op
1 +h
] when Na and N b are independent Poisson processes with intensity
ν/2. We have
E[I2
τ
op
1 +h
] = v2E[
(
(Na
τ
op
1 +h
−Na
τ
op
1
+Na
τ
op
1
)− (N b
τ
op
1 +h
−N b
τ
op
1
+N b
τ
op
1
)
)2
].
Using the strong Markov property of Poisson process and taking conditional expectation with respect
to τ op1 we get
E[I2
τ
op
1 +h
] = v2(νh+ 1),
where we use E[Na
τ
op
1
] = E[(Na
τ
op
1
)2] = 1/2.
C Existence of a Nash equilibrium
In this section, we set h > 0 as a terminal time of the auction to investigate the game played by
the market takers.
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C.1 Nash equilibrium
We are interested in finding a Nash equilibrium to the game between buyers and sellers. Starting
at (Na0 , N
b
0) = (α, β) ∈ N2, we set6
V a,α,βh (λa, λb) = E
P
λa,λb [Nah (N
a
h −N bh)] (13)
V b,α,βh (λa, λb) = E
P
λa,λb [N bh(N
b
h −Nah)]. (14)
Formally, we can thus compute the optimal P&L of market takers for buy orders and sell orders by
solving the following coupled system
inf
λa∈U
V a,α,βh (λa, λ
⋆
b) = E
P
λ⋆a,λ
⋆
b [Nah (N
a
h −N bh)]
inf
λb∈U
V b,α,βh (λ
⋆
a, λb) = E
P
λ⋆a,λ
⋆
b [N bh(N
b
h −Nah )]
, (15)
where λ⋆b and λ
⋆
b are simultaneous optimizers of (13) and (14) respectively (depending on the action
of market takers having the opposite behavior).
We now investigate theoretically the existence of a Nash equilibrium associated with (15). First we
introduce some notations.
• Let Ω be the set of piece-wise constant functions with jumps of size 1. Consider7 X =
(Na, N b)⊤ be the canonical processes in Ω2 and F = (Fs)0≤s≤h the smallest filtration for
which X is adapted.
• Let P be a probability measure on (Ω2,Fh) such that
Ms = Xs − sL0, with L0 := (λ0, λ0)⊤, 0 < λ0 < λ+, s ∈ [0, h],
is a local martingale. A proof of the existence of such measure P is given in Jacod (1975). We
set Mar := M1,r (resp. M
b
r := M2,r) the first (resp. the second) component of M . Moreover
to any pair (λa, λb) ∈ U2 of admissible controls we associate Pλa,λb the measure defined by
dPλ
a,λb
dP
= exp
(∫ h
0
log
(λas
λ0
)
dNas −
(
λas − λ0
)
ds+ log
(λbs
λ0
)
dN bs −
(
λbs − λ0
)
ds
)
.
Hence, under the measure Pλ
a,λb ,(
Xs −
∫ s
0
(λau, λ
b
u)
⊤du
)
0≤s≤h
6Rigorously speaking we should write V i,α,β0 (λa, λb, h) instead of V
i,α,β
h (λa, λb) with i ∈ {a, b}, since we define here
the value function of each market taker at time 0 and h is a time horizon. Since we consider only value functions of
market takers at time 0, we make this slight abuse of notation.
7Here for the notation ⊤ denotes the transposition of a vector to identify as usual any element of N2 with a column
vector.
23
is a martingale.
• For (E, ‖ · ‖) a normed space, any 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ h and p > 1, we define
Hps,t(E) = {Y, E − valued and F− adapted process s.t.,E[(
∫ t
s
‖Yr‖2dr)
p
2 ] < +∞}
Sps,t(E) = {Y, E − valued and F− adapted process s.t.,E[sup
s≤t
‖Yr‖pdr] < +∞}
L
p(E) = {ξ, E − valued Fh −measurable random variable, s.t. E[‖ξ‖p] < +∞}.
When s = 0 we omit the index s in the previous definitions. If E = R2, we set ‖ · ‖2 and ‖ · ‖1
the classical Manhattan norm and Euclidean norm on R2 respectively. For any R2−valued
process Y := (Yr)0≤r≤h, we denote by Yr,1 and Yr,2 its first and second coordinates respectively
for any time r ∈ [0, h].
• For any z ∈ R2 and εa, εb ∈ [λ−, λ+], we set
(L)
{
λ⋆a(z, ε
a) = 1z1>0λ− + 1z1<0λ+ + ε
a1z1=0
λ⋆b(z, ε
b) = 1z2>0λ− + 1z2<0λ+ + ε
b1z2=0.
Note that both z1λ
⋆
a(z, ε
a) and z2λ
⋆
b(z, ε
b) do not depend on εa and εb. To alleviate nota-
tions, when one of these products appears, we will denote it simply by z1λ
⋆
a(z) and z2λ
⋆
b(z)
respectively.
• For any z, z˜ ∈ R2 and any ε ∈ [λ−, λ+], we set Ha,⋆(z, z˜, ε) = z1λ⋆a(z) + z2λ⋆b(z˜, ε) and
Hb,⋆(z, z˜, ε) = z2λ
⋆
b(z) + z1λ
⋆
a(z˜, ε).
• for x ∈ N2 we define ga(x) = x1(x1 − x2) and gb(x) = x2(x2 − x1).
• Let U be a map from [0, h] × N2 into R. For any (s, α, β) ∈ [0, h] × N2 we set
(D)

DaU(s, α, β) = U(s, α+ 1, β)− U(s, α, β)
DbU(s, α, β) = U(s, α, β + 1)− U(s, α, β)
)
DU(s, α, β) = (DaU(s, α, β),DbU(s, α, β))
⊤.
We first provide a very general result by associated to the existence of a Nash equilibrium for (15)
a system of coupled ODE on N2, as a direct extension of (Dockner et al., 2000, Theorem 8.5).
Proposition C.1. Assume that there exist two maps εa, εb from [0, h]×N2 into [λ−, λ+] such that
the following coupled system
(S)

∂sV
a +Ha,⋆(DV a,DV b, εb) = 0, s ∈ [0, h), (α, β) ∈ N2
V a(h, α, β) = ga(α, β),
∂sV
b +Hb,⋆(DV b,DV a, εa) = 0, s ∈ [0, h), (α, β) ∈ N2
V b(h, α, β) = gb(α, β),
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has a continuously differentiable (in time) solution denoted by (V a, V b) on [0, h] × N2 and assume
moreover that
DV i(·, Na· , N b· ) ∈ H2h(R2), i = a, b.
Then, (λ⋆a(DV
a, εa), λ⋆b(DV
b, εb)) is a Nash equilibrium for (15).
Proof. The proof follows a standard verification argument. Notice however that we need feed-
back control for the thresholds (εa, εb) in order to have classical HJB equations. See for instance
(Dockner et al., 2000, Theorem 8.5).
Although the previous result provides sufficient conditions to get a Nash equilibrium for the stochas-
tic differential game (15), it is quite hard to justify such existence in practice. Note indeed that
the optimizers λ⋆a and λ
⋆
b are singular in view of their definition (L). Thus, the main difficulty en-
countered in this proposition is to solve the bang-bang type system (S) of ODEs on N2 for relevant
thresholds εa, εb. As far as we now, we have no PDE results ensuring the existence of a solution to
(S).
Inspired by Hamade`ne and Mu (2014), we thus propose to study a smooth approximation of (S)
and then to build a sequence of processes converging (up to a subsequence) to a Nash equilibrium
for the game (15).
Let n ∈ N. We consider the smoothed control functions for any z ∈ R
λn(z) =

λ+ if z ≤ − 1n
λ− if z ≥ 1n
nλ−−λ+2 z +
λ++λ−
2 if z ∈ (− 1n , 1n).
The functions λn and z 7−→ zλn(z) are Lipschitz continuous. Also consider Φn, the truncation
function defined for any x ∈ R by
Φn(x) = (x ∧ n) ∨ (−n).
Hence, we introduction the smoother of H⋆ denoted by H⋆,n and defined by for any (z1, z2, z˜) ∈ R3
by
H⋆,n(z1, z2, z˜) = Φn(z1λ
n(z1)) + Φn(z2)λ
n(z˜).
Theorem C.1. For any n ∈ N, there exists a unique (viscosity) solution denoted by V a,n to the
following system of integro-PDEs
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(Sn)

∂sV
a,n +H⋆,n(DaV
a,n,DbV
a,n,DbV
b,n) = 0, s ∈ [0, h), (α, β) ∈ N2,
V a,n(h, α, β) = ga(α, β),
∂sV
b,n +H⋆,n(DbV
b,n,DaV
b,n,DaV
a,n) = 0, s ∈ [0, h), (α, β) ∈ N2,
V b,n(h, α, β) = gb(α, β).
Moreover,
• The system (Sn) admits a unique viscosity solution.
• There exists a subsequence (nk)k≥0 and two measurable applications V a, V b from [0, h] × N2
into R such that for any (s, α, β) ∈ [0, h] × N2
lim
k→+∞
V i,nk(s, α, β) = V i(s, α, β), i ∈ {a, b}
and
lim
n→+∞
DV i,n(s, α, β) = DV i(s, α, β), i ∈ {a, b}.
• Moreover λnk(DaV a,nk(·, Na, N b))1DaV a(·,Na,Nb)=0 and λnk(DbV b,nk(·, Na, N b))1DbV b(·,Na,Nb)=0
converges weakly in H2h(R2) to some progressively measurable and [λ−, λ+]-valued processes
denoted respectively by θ and ϑ.
Thus, (λ⋆a, λ
⋆
b) = (λ
⋆
a(DV
a(s,Nas , N
b
s ), θs), λ
⋆
b(DV
b(s,Nas , N
b
s ), ϑs))0≤s≤t is a Nash equilibrium for
the game (15) and V i,α,βh (λ
⋆
a, λ
⋆
b) = V
i(0, α, β), i ∈ {a, b}.
We give here the sketch of the proof of this result. The details are postponed to Appendix C.2.
Sketch of the proof of Theorem C.1 The proof will be divided in three steps. The main tool
used is the theory of BSDE with jumps (see Tang and Li (1994); Buckdahn and Pardoux (1994);
Barles et al. (1997)) and their representations through integro-partial differential equations.
Step 1. We associated to the system (Sn) a two dimensional BSDE for which it is well-known that
there exists a unique solutions in appropriate spaces.
Step 2. By mimicking the proof of Theorem 2.5 in Hamade`ne and Mu (2014) extended to the case of
counting processes, we prove that the solution of the BSDE associated to (Sn) converges up
to a subsequence to a solution of a two-dimensional BSDE associated with the system (S).
Step 3. We prove that this approximation provides a Nash equilibrium for the game (15) with well-
chosen thresholds obtained in Step 2 as limits of functions of the components of the solution
to the approached BSDE considered, see Proposition C.2 below.
We conclude thanks to semi-linear Feynman-Kac formula for BSDEs and the system (Sn)
established in Step 1, together with convergence results.
26
C.2 Proof of Theorem C.1
For the proof we follow the methodology of Hamade`ne and Mu (2014). First we introduce a series
of smoothed BSDE with Lipschitz generator by smoothing the controls λ⋆a, λ
⋆
b . Then we show
that the solution of the smoothed BSDE converges (up to a subsequence) almost surely towards a
solution of Equation (28).
We have the following a priori estimates results which is a consequence of the BDG inequalities and
of the Gronwall Lemma.
Lemma C.1. For (s, x) ∈ [0, h] × N2 let Xs,x be the process in Ω defined onto [s, h] by
Xs,xu = x+Xu −Xs.
We have for any s ∈ [0, h] and ρ > 0
E[ sup
s≤u≤h
‖Xs,xu ‖ρ1] ≤ Cρ(1 + |x1|ρ + |x2|ρ)
and for any (λa, λb) ∈ U2
E
P
λa,λb [ sup
s≤u≤h
‖Xs,xu ‖ρ1] ≤ Cρ(1 + |x1|ρ + |x2|ρ)
We now turn to the proof of Theorem C.1.
C.2.1 Step 1: Approximation, existence and uniqueness
From now, s ∈ [0, h). We recall the definition of smoothed control functions
λn(z) =

λ+ if z ≤ − 1n
λ− if z ≥ 1n
nλ−−λ+2 z +
λ++λ−
2 if z ∈ (− 1n , 1n)
Consider Φn, the truncation function
Φn(x) = (x ∧ n) ∨ (−n).
Now we define the system of smoothed BSDEs for any u ∈ [s, h]:
(Jn)

−dY a,n;s,xu = (H⋆,n(Za,n;s,x1,u , Za,n;s,x2,u , Zb,n;s,x2,u )− L0 · Za,n;s,xu )du− Za,n;s,xu · dMu,
Y a,n;s,xh = g
a(Xs,xh )
−dY b,n;s,xu = (H⋆,n(Zb,n;s,x2,u , Zb,n;s,x1,u , Za,n;s,x1,u )− L0 · Zb,n;s,xu )du− Zb,n;s,xu · dMu,
Y b,n;s,xh = g
b(Xs,xh ),
27
with Zi,n;s,xu = (Z
i,n;s,x
1,u , Z
i,n;s,x
2,u )
⊤ for any i ∈ {a, b}.
From Proposition 2.1. in Buckdahn and Pardoux (1994) since Φn is Lipschitz continuous there
exists a unique solution to (Jn) such that
(
(Y a,n;s,x, Za,n;s,x), (Y b,n;s,x, Zb,n;s,x)
) ∈ (S2s,h(R)×H2s,h(R2))2.
Moreover (Proposition 3.8. in Buckdahn and Pardoux (1994)) there exist measurable deterministic
functions V a,n, V b,n defined on [s, h]× N2 with values in R such that:
∀u ∈ [s, h], Y i,n;s,xu = V i,n(s,Xs,xu ) and Zi,n;s,xu = DV i,n(u,Xs,xu− ), for i = a, b. (16)
From Theorem 3.4. in Barles et al. (1997), we know that the unique solution of (Jn) provides a
unique viscosity solution denoted by (V a,n, V b,n) to (Sn) and given by (16).
Before going to the convergence of Y i,n and Zi,n, notice that by considering the generator functions{
Ha,n(u, x) =
(
Φn(DaV
a,n(u, x)λn(DaV
a,n(u, x))) + Φn(DbV
a,n(u, x))λn(DbV
b,n(u, x))
)
Hb,n(u, x) =
(
Φn(DbV
b,n(u, x)λn(DbV
b,n(u, x))) + Φn(DaV
b,n(u, x))λn(DaV
a,n(u, x))
)
,
we deduce from (16) that
Ha,n(u,Xs,x
u−
) = H⋆,n(Za,n;s,x1,u , Z
a,n;s,x
2,u , Z
b,n;s,x
2,u ),
and
Hb,n(u,Xs,x
u−
) = H⋆,n(Zb,n;s,x2,u , Z
b,n;s,x
1,u , Z
a,n;s,x
1,u ),
so that (Jn) becomes
(J˜n)
{
−dY a,n;s,xu = (Ha,n(s,Xs,xu− )− L0 · Z
a,n;s,x
u )du− Za,n;s,xu · dMu, Y a,n;s,xh = ga(Xs,xh )
−dY b,n;s,xu = (Hb,n(u,Xs,xu− )− L0 · Z
b,n;s,x
u )du− Zb,n;s,xu · dMu, Y b,n;s,xh = gb(Xs,xh ).
C.2.2 Step 2: Convergence to the solution of a bang-bang system of BSDEs
From now, we consider any index i equals to a or b, we set x ∈ N2 and s ∈ [0, h].
Step 2a. Uniform estimates.
In order to use dominated convergence we give some uniform a priori estimates for processes
(Y i,n;s,x, Zi,n;s,x).
We first aim at using a comparison principle to control the upper bound of Y i,n and introduce the
following BSDE
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Y
i,n;s,x
u = g
i(Xs,xh ) +
∫ h
u
4λ+‖Zi,n;s,xr ‖1dr −
∫ h
u
Z
i,n;s,x
r · dMr, s ≤ u ≤ h. (17)
Once again according to Buckdahn and Pardoux (1994) there exists a unique solution (Y
i,n;s,x
, Z
i,n;s,x
)
of the above BSDE in the space S2s,h(R)×H2s,h(R2) and there exists deterministic measurable func-
tions V
i,n
such that for any u ∈ [s, h]:
Y
i,n;s,x
u = V
i,n
(u,Xs,xu ).
By comparison theorem for BSDE (see for instance8 Theorem 2.5 in Royer (2006)), for any time
s ≤ u ≤ h we get
Y i,n;s,xu ≤ Y i,n;s,xu ,P− a.s. (18)
We now give a uniform estimates of Y
i,n;s,x
to get a uniform estimates for Y i,n;s,x in view of the
previous relation. Consider the bi-dimensional process:
M i,nu =Mu − 4λ+sign(Zi,n;s,xu ),
where the sign is taken coordinate by coordinate. The process M i,n = (M i,n1 ,M
i,n
2 ) is a bi-
dimensional martingale under the probability Pi,n equivalent to P with density given by
E i,nh = exp
( ∫ h
0
log(
γi,nt,1
λ0
)dNat − (γi,nt,1 − λ0)dt+ log(
γi,nt,2
λ0
)dN bt − (γi,nt,2 − λ0)dt
)
with
γi,nt,j = λ0 + 4λ+sign(Z
i,n;t,x
j,t ).
Consequently we get
V
i,n
(s, x) = EP
i,n
[gi(X
s,x
h )].
By polynomial growth of gi we deduce that there exists a positive constant C˜ such that
|V i,n(s, x)| ≤ C˜EPi,n[‖Xs,xh ‖22].
Note that there exists a positive constant κ˜ such that
E
Pi,n [‖Xs,xh ‖22] ≤ κ˜(‖x‖22 + 1).
The previous equation implies the following polynomial growth bound
|V i,n(s, x)| ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖22),
8To be more accurate, we identify our pair of processes as a compound Poisson process with jumps in {−1, 1}, so
that we are in the framework of Royer (2006) for a compensator λ(dx) = λ0(δ1(dx) + δ−1(dx)).
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where C := C˜κ˜ > 0.
According to the comparison result (18) together with (16), we deduce that there exists some
positive constant C, which does not depend on n, such that
V i,n(s, x) ≤ C(1 + |x1|2 + |x2|2).
Similarly, by considering a BSDE similar to (17) but with a minus sign in the generator, we get
V i,n(s, x) ≥ −C(1 + |x1|2 + |x2|2).
We thus deduce that for any (s, x) ∈ [0, h] × N2 and p ≥ 1 the following estimate holds for some
positive constant Cp
E[ sup
s≤u≤h
|Y i,n;s,xu |p] ≤ Cp(1 + |x1|2p + |x2|2p). (19)
Moreover, the characterization (16) allows to transfer the prior estimates of Y i,n;s,x to Zi,n;s,x. In
particular we get that for any p ≥ 1
E[ sup
s≤u≤h
|Zi,n;s,xu |p] ≤ Cp(1 + |x1|2p + |x2|2p). (20)
Note that the constant Cp does not depend on n, so that Estimates (19) and (20) are uniform with
respect to n.
Step 2b. Convergence of the solutions of the smoothed BSDE.
We now turn to the convergence of (Y i,n;s,x, Zi,n;s,x), in S2s,h(R) × H2s,h(R2). For any q ≤ 2, there
exists a positive constant C˜ which does not depend on n such that
E[
∫ h
0
|H i,n(r,X0,0
r−
)|qdr ≤ E[
∫ h
0
2λ+‖Zi,n;0,0r ‖q1dr] ≤ C˜.
The sequence (H i,n)n≥0 is bounded in L
2
(
[0, h]×N2,dr×µ(0, 0; r,dx)) where µ(0, 0; r,dx) is the law
of X0,0
r−
under P. Thus there exists a subsequence (nk)k≥0 such that (H
i,nk)k≥0 converges weakly
in L2([0, h] × R, µ(0, 0; r,dx)dr). We omit the index k and still write n instead of nk to reduce the
notations.
We now prove that for any (s, x) ∈ [0, h] × N2, (V i,n(s, x))n≥0 is a Cauchy sequence. We set
the function ∆i,n,m(t, x, zn, zm) := H
i,n(t, x) − H i,m(t, x) − L0 · (zn − zm) with (n,m) ∈ N and
(t, x, zn, zm) ∈ [0, T ] × N2 × R2 × R2. Let δ ∈ [0, h− s] and k ∈ N, we have
|V i,n(s, x)− V i,m(s, x)| = |E[
∫ h
s
∆i,n,m(r,Xs,x
r−
, Zi,n;s,xr , Z
i,m;s,x
r )dr]|
≤ Es+δ,h− +Es+δ,h+ + Es,s+δ, (21)
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with
Es+δ,h− := |E[
∫ h
s+δ
1‖Xs,x
r−
‖∞≤k∆
i,n,m(r,Xs,x
r−
, Zi,n;s,xr , Z
i,m;s,x
r )dr]|,
Es+δ,h+ := |E[
∫ h
s+δ
1‖Xs,x
r−
‖∞>k∆
i,n,m(r,Xs,x
r−
, Zi,n;s,xr , Z
i,m;s,x
r )dr]|,
and
Es,s+δ := |E[
∫ s+δ
s
∆i,n,m(r,Xs,x
r−
, Zi,n;s,xr , Z
i,m;s,x
r )dr]|.
We obtain from (20) that there exists some constant C independent of n and m such that
Es,s+δ ≤ Cδ.
We now turn to Es+δ,h+ . By using Cauchy Schwarz and Markov inequalities together with the prior
inequalities (19) and (20), there exists a positive constant Cˆ again independent of n and m such
that for any positive integer k
Es+δ,h+ ≤ |E[
∫ h
s+δ
1‖Xs,x
r−
‖∞>kdr]|
1
2 |E[
∫ h
s+δ
∆i,n,m(r,Xs,x
r−
, Zi,n;s,xr , Z
i,m;s,x
r )
2dr]| 12
≤ Cˆ√
k
.
Finally, we note that
Es+δ,h− =
∣∣ ∑
(p,q)∈N2
∫ h
s
∆i,n,m(r, p, q,DV i,n(t, p, q),DV i,m(t, p, q))P
(
Xt,(0,0)r = (p, q)
)
φs,x(r, p, q)dr
∣∣
with
φs,x(r, p, q) = 1p≤k1q≤k1r≥s+δ
P
(
Xt,xr = (p, q)
)
P
(
X
t,(0,0)
r = (p, q)
) .
Since
P
(
Xt,(0,0)r = (p, q)
)−1
= e2λ0r
p!q!
(λ0r)p+q
is bounded for p and q lower than k and r lower than h. The function φs,x is bounded and thus in
L
2([0, h] × N2, µ(0, 0; s,dx) × ds)) consequently by weak convergence of H i,n, we have that Es+δ,h−
goes to 0 when m,n go to infinity. Hence, taking the limit when δ goes to 0 and k, n,m go to
infinity, we deduce from (21) that (V i,n(s, x))n≥0 is a Cauchy sequence. We thus denote by V
i(s, x)
the limit of (V i,n(s, x))n≥0. We recall that V
i depends on the subsequence (nk)k≥0
We have the P-almost sure convergence (up to the subsequence) of Y i,n;s,xu since Y
i,n;s,x
u = V i,n(u,X
s,x
u ).
We denote by Y i;s,x the almost sure limit of Y i,n;s,x. Notice moreover that in view of (D), we have
lim
n→+∞
DV i,n(s, x) = DV i(s, x), (s, x) ∈ [0, h] × N2. (22)
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By Equation (19) and Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem we have for any ρ ≥ 1
E[
∫ h
s
|Y i,n;s,xr − Y i;s,xr |ρdr] →
n→+∞
0. (23)
Let now n,m be two positive integers. From Ito’s formula applied to (Y i,n;s,x − Y i,m;s,x)2 we get
for any s ≤ u ≤ h
|Y i,n;s,xu − Y i,m;s,xu |2
= −
∫ h
u
|Zi,n;s,x1,r − Zi,m;s,x1,r |2d(Mar + λ0r)−
∫ h
u
|Zi,n;s,x2,r − Zi,m;s,x2,r |2d(M br + λ0r)
+ 2
∫ h
u
(Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr )
(
(H i,n −H i,m)(r,Xt,x
r−
)− L0 · (Zi,n;s,xr − Zi,m;s,xr )
)
dr
− 2
∫ h
u
(Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr )(Zi,n;s,xr − Zi,m;s,xr ) · dMr. (24)
Using Young’s inequality and the definitions of Hn and Hm we deduce that there exists a positive
constant c˜ (independent of n and m) such that for any ε > 0
|Y i,n;s,xu − Y i,m;s,xu |2 +
∫ h
u
λ0‖Zi,n;s,xr − Zi,m;s,xr ‖22dr
≤ c˜ε|λ+|2
∫ h
u
(‖Zi,n;s,xr ‖22 + ‖Zi,m;s,xr ‖22)dr + 1ε
∫ h
u
|Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr |2dr
− 2
∫ h
u
(Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr )(Zi,n;s,xr − Zi,m;s,xr ) · dMr
−
∫ h
u
|Zi,n;s,x1,r − Zi,m;s,x1,r |2dMar −
∫ h
u
|Zi,n;s,x2,r − Zi,m;s,x2,r |2dM br .
For u = s, by taking the expectation and by choosing n,m large enough, we obtain from (20) and
(22), (23) and the fact that ε is arbitrary small that the following convergence holds
lim sup
n,m→+∞
E[
∫ h
s
‖Zi,n;s,xr − Zi,m;s,xr ‖22dr] = 0. (25)
Hence, (Zi,n;s,x)n∈N is a Cauchy sequence (along the subsequence) and thus converges in H2s,h(R2)
to some process (Zi;s,xu )s≤u≤h.
Similarly, by using (24) and by noting that− ∫ h
u
|Zi,n;s,x1,r −Zi,m;s,x1,r |2d(Mar+λ0r) ≤ 0 and−
∫ h
u
|Zi,n;s,x2,r −
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Zi,m;s,x2,r |2d(M br + λ0r) ≤ 0 since Mα· + λ0· = X· is a non decreasing process for α ∈ {a, b}, we have
E[ sup
u∈[s,h]
|Y i,n;s,xu − Y i,m;s,xu |2]
≤ c˜ε|λ+|2E[
∫ h
s
(‖Zi,n;s,xr ‖22 + ‖Zi,m;s,xr ‖22)dr] + 1εE[
∫ h
s
|Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr |2dr]
+ 2E[
∫ h
0
|Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr ||Zi,n;s,x1,r − Zi,m;s,x1,r |(dNar + λ0dr)]
+ 2E[
∫ h
0
|Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr ||Zi,n;s,x2,r − Zi,m;s,x2,r |(dN br + λ0dr)]
≤ c˜ε|λ+|2E[
∫ h
s
(‖Zi,n;s,xr ‖22 + ‖Zi,m;s,xr ‖22)dr] + 1εE[
∫ h
s
|Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr |2dr]
+ 2E[
∫ h
0
|Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr ||Zi,n;s,x1,r − Zi,m;s,x1,r |(dMar + 2λ0dr)]
+ 2E[
∫ h
0
|Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr ||Zi,n;s,x2,r − Zi,m;s,x2,r |(dM br + 2λ0dr)]
≤ c˜ε|λ+|2E[
∫ h
s
(‖Zi,n;s,xr ‖22 + ‖Zi,m;s,xr ‖22)dr] + 1εE[
∫ h
s
|Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr |2dr]
+ 4λ0E[
∫ h
0
|Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr |‖Zi,n;s,xr − Zi,m;s,xr ‖1dr].
By using again Young inequality for the last term in the previous inequality with the same ε, we
deduce that there exists a positive constant c > 0 independent of n,m and ε such that
E[ sup
u∈[s,h]
|Y i,n;s,xu − Y i,m;s,xu |2]
≤ c(ε|λ+|2E[∫ h
s
(‖Zi,n;s,xr ‖22 + ‖Zi,m;s,xr ‖22)dr] + 1εE[
∫ h
s
|Y i,n;s,xr − Y i,m;s,xr |2dr]
)
.
Since ε is arbitrary and because of Equations (19), (20) and (23) we deduce
lim sup
n,m→+∞
E[ sup
u∈[s,t]
|Y i,n;s,xu − Y i,m;s,xu |2] = 0.
So we have the convergence of (Y i,n;s,x)n≥0 in S2s,h(R) towards a process (Y i;s,xu )s≤u≤h up to a sub-
sequence.
Step 2c. Convergence of the generator
We study the convergence of (H i,n)n≥0, for i ∈ {a, b} (still along the subsequence introduced in
Step 2b.). We focus on (Ha,n)n≥0, the proof is identical for (H
b,n)n≥0. Recall that
Ha,n(u,Xs,x
u−
) = Φn(Z
a,n;s,x
1,u λ
⋆
a(Z
a,n;s,x
1,u )) + Φn(Z
a,n;s,x
2,u )λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u ).
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First note that
Φn(Z
a,n;s,x
1,u λ
⋆
a(Z
a,n;s,x
1,u )) →n→+∞ Z
a;s,x
1,u λ
⋆
a(Z
a;s,x
1,u )
with convergence taking place P-a.s. and in H2s,u(R2) by dominated convergence and uniform
integrability of (‖Za,n;s,x‖22)n≥0. We split the remaining part in a continuous and a non continuous
parts
Φn(Z
a,n;s,x
2,u )λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u ) = Φn(Z
a,n;s,x
2,u )λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,xu 6=0
+Φn(Z
a,n;s,x
2,u )λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
.
We have the convergence of Φn(Z
a,n;s,x
2,u )λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u 6=0
, ds× dP a.e and the convergence also
holds in H2s,h(R2). Moreover, (λn(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,xu =0)n≥0 being bounded we denote by ϑ a weak limit
in H2s,h(R2).
Now we show that for any stopping time τ ∈ [s, h] we have in the sense of weak convergence in
L
2(R): ∫ τ
s
Φn(Z
a,n;s,x
2,u )λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
du →
n→+∞
∫ τ
s
Za;s,x2,u ϑu1Zb;s,x2,u
du. (26)
We have∫ τ
s
Φn(Z
a,n;s,x
2,u )λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
du =
∫ τ
s
(Φn(Z
a,n;s,x
2,u )− Za;s,x2,u )λn(Zb,n;s,x2,u ))1Zb,s,x2,u =0du
+
∫ τ
s
Za;s,x2,u λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
ds.
The first term in the previous equality converges to 0 in L2(R) by dominated convergence therefore
it converges weakly. Now we show that the second term converges weakly. We prove that for any
random variable ξ ∈ L2(R) and Fh-measurable the following convergence holds
E[ξ
∫ τ
s
Za;s,x2,u λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
du] →
n→+∞
E[ξ
∫ τ
s
Za;s,x2,u ϑu1Zb;s,x2,u =0
du]. (27)
Using a martingale decomposition result for martingales associated to jump processes, see Davis
(1976), to the conditional expectation of ξ with respect to the filtration F we have
E[ξ|Fτ ] = E[ξ] +
∫ τ
s
Λu · dMu
for some Λ ∈ H2s,h(R2). Consequently
E[ξ
∫ τ
s
Za;s,x2,u λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
du] = E[
∫ τ
s
Λu · dMu
∫ τ
s
Za;s,x2,u λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
du]
+E[ξ]E[
∫ τ
s
Za;s,x2,u λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
du].
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Notice moreover that
E[ξ]E[
∫ τ
s
Za;s,x2,u λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
du] →
n→+∞
E[ξ]E[
∫ τ
s
Za;s,x2,u ϑu1Zb;s,x2,u =0
du]
since λn(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
converges to ϑu1Zb;s,x2,u =0
and since Za;s,x ∈ H2s,h(R2). Using Ito’s formula,
we get
E[
∫ τ
s
Λu · dMu
∫ τ
s
Za;s,x2,u λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
du]
= E
[ ∫ τ
s
( ∫ u
s
Za;s,xr,2 λ
n(Zb,n;s,xr,2 )1Zb;s,xr,2 =0
dr
)
Λu · dMu
]
+ E
[ ∫ τ
s
∫ u
s
Λr · dMrZa;s,x2,u λn(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0du
]
.
The first term is equal to zero. Concerning the second term, we set ψr =
∫ r
s
Λu · dMu. Hence, for
any κ ≥ 0
E[
∫ τ
s
ψuZ
a;s,x
2,u (λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )1Zb;s,x2,u =0
− ϑu)du]
= E[
∫ τ
s
ψuZ
a;s,x
2,u 1|ψuZa;s,x2,u |<κ(λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u )− ϑu)1Zb;s,x2,u =0du]
+ E[
∫ τ
s
ψuZ
a;s,x
2,u 1|ψuZa;s,x2,u |≥κ(λ
n(Zb,n;s,x2,u ) − ϑu)1Zb;s,x2,u =0du].
The first term in the previous expression converges to 0 since λn(Zb,n;s,x2,· )1Zb;s,x2,· =0
converges weakly
towards ϑ. The second one goes to zero when κ goes to infinity as ψ‖Za;s,x‖2 is in H2s,h(R). We
have proved the convergence (27). Hence, the convergence (26) holds weakly in L2(R).
We deduce that
∫ τ
s
Ha,n(u,Xs,xu )du converges weakly to
∫ τ
0 H
a,⋆(Za;s,xu , Z
b;s,x
u , ϑu)du in L
2(R) along
the subsequence (nk)k≥0.
Step 2d. Convergence to the solution of a bang-bang BSDE
If we write the first BSDE in the system (Jn) in a forward way, we get
Y a,n;s,xτ = Y
a,n;s,x
s −
∫ τ
s
Ha,n(u,Xs,x
u−
)du+
∫ τ
s
Za,n;s,xu dMu.
We recall that we write n instead of nk so that all the convergence that we obtain has to be under-
stood up to a subsequence. Thus, from the almost sure and S2s,h(R) convergence of (Y a,n;s,x)n≥0 to
Y a;s,x together with ∫ τ
s
Za,n;s,xu · dMu →
n→+∞
∫ τ
s
Za;s,xu · dMu, in L2(R),
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and the convergence of the generator Ha,n proved in Step 2c, we deduce that
Y a;s,xτ = Y
a;s,x
s −
∫ τ
s
Ha,⋆(Za;s,xu , Z
b;s,x
u , ϑu)du+
∫ τ
s
Za;s,xu dMu, P− a.s.
This result being true for any stopping time τ ∈ [s, h], the processes on both sides are indistinguish-
able and we have
P− a.s. Y a;s,xu = Y a;s,xs −
∫ u
s
Ha,⋆(Za;s,xr , Z
b;s,x
r , ϑr)dr +
∫ u
s
Za;s,xr dMr, ∀u ∈ [s, h].
Finally we have
P− a.s. Y a;s,xu = ga(Xs,xh ) +
∫ h
u
Ha,⋆(Za;s,xr , Z
b;s,x
r , ϑr)dr −
∫ h
u
Za;s,xr dMr, ∀u ∈ [s, h].
with Y a;s,x ∈ S2s,h(R) and Za;s,x ∈ H2s,h(R2). We have the same result by considering the index b
and by denoting θu the almost sure limit of (λ
n(Za,n;s,xu )1Za,n;s,xu =0)n≥0 which holds also in H2s,h by
the dominated convergence theorem.
Step 3: Nash equilibrium and conclusion.
We have seen in the previous step that we can build ϑ and θ, which are functions of (u,Nau , N
b
u)
ensuring the existence of a solution a solution (Y a, Y b, Za, Zb) ∈ (S2s,h(R))2 × (H2s,h(R2))2 to the
following coupled BSDE (by taking s = 0),{
−dY au = Ha,⋆(Zau , Zbu, ϑu)− Zau · dMu, Y ah = ga(X0,0t )
−dY bu = Hb,⋆(Zau, Zbu, θu)− Zbu · dMu, Y bh = gb(X0,0t ).
(28)
We could rely this BSDE to the system (S) and use Proposition C.1. However, we are not able to
prove the continuous differentiability of the functions V i with respect to the time variable. It is
why we use the theory of BSDEs similarly to Hamade`ne and Mu (2014) with the proposition below
to conclude.
Proposition C.2 (Extension of Theorems 2.5 and 2.6 in Hamade`ne and Mu (2014)). There exist
a pair of deterministic functions V a, V b and some adapted processes ϑ and θ with values in [λ−, λ+]
such that
• BSDE (28) admits a solution (Y a, Y b, Za, Zb) ∈ (S2h(R))2 × (H2h(R2))2,
• V a and V b are two deterministic measurable functions with polynomial growth from [0, h]×R2
to R such that P−as, ∀u ≤ h, Y au = V a(u,Xu) and Y bu = V b(u,Xu).
• The pair of controls (λ⋆a(Zau , θu), λ⋆b(Zbu, ϑu))u≤t defined by (L) where ϑ and θ are obtained as
an almost sure (up to a subsequence) and H2h(R2) limits of λn(Zb,nu )1Zbu=0 and λn(Z
a,n
u )1Zau=0
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respectively is a bang-bang type Nash equilibrium point of the non zero-sum stochastic differ-
ential game (15).
Proof. Properties 1. and 2. are direct consequences of the proof made in Step 2. Property 3. is
obtained by adapting the proof of Proposition 2.4 in Hamade`ne and Mu (2014) to the jump case,
with minimizations instead of maximizations.
Hence, Step 1 provides that the system (Sn) admits a unique viscosity solution given by the unique
solution of (J˜n) which approaches the solution of (28) so that λn(Zb,nu )1Zbu=0 and λ
n(Za,nu )1Zau=0
converge almost surely up to a subsequence (and in fact in H2h(R2)) to a Nash equilibrium for the
game (15) by using Proposition C.2. This concludes the proof of Theorem C.1.
C.3 Proof of Corollary 3.1 and numerical method
In Theorem C.1 we only get convergence results up to a subsequence. However numerically we
observe that the sequence (V i,n)n≥0 converges for i = a or b. Therefore to approach the solution
of the system (S) we solve the approached system (Sn) for n large. To implement the numerical
method we need to bound the domain. In practice this means that there is only a limited number
of orders in auctions. Thus we consider the new system
(SnQ)

∂sV
a,n +Ha,n(DQa V a,n,D
Q
b V
a,n,DQb V
b,n) = 0, s ∈ [0, h), (α, β) ∈ {0, . . . , Q}2,
V a,n(h, α, β) = ga(α, β),
∂sV
b,n +Hb,n(DQb V
b,n,DQa V b,n,D
Q
a V a,n)) = 0, s ∈ [0, h), (α, β) ∈ {0, . . . , Q}2,
V b,n(h, α, β) = gb(α, β),
on the domain [0, h] × {0, . . . , Q}2. The operators (DQa ,DQb ) are defined similarly to (Da,Db) with
the following boundary conditions
DQa V (s,Q,m) = 0 and D
Q
b V (s, n,Q) = 0 for any (s, n,m) ∈ [0, h] × {0, . . . , Q}2.
Interpreting (Snb) as an ordinary differential equation in R
(Q+1)2 according to Cauchy-Lipschitz
Theorem we have existence of a solution (V a,nQ , V
b,n
Q ) for the system (S
n
Q) which is unique.
Remember that in our model the auction starts at time τ = inf{s > 0 s.t. Nas + N bs > 0}. Con-
sequently market takers optimize their behavior by controlling the processes (Naτ+·, N
b
τ+·). Now
remark that
I2τ+h = N
a
τ+h(N
a
τ+h −N bτ+h) +N bτ+h(N bτ+h −Naτ+h).
Consequently, the symmetry of the problem with respect to a and b leads to
E[I2τ+h] = P(N
a
τ = 1)
(
V a(0, 1, 0) + V b(0, 1, 0)
)
+ P(N bτ = 1)
(
V a(0, 0, 1) + V b(0, 0, 1)
)
.
Now we assume that market takers controls their intensities using a pair of Nash Equilibrium
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controls (λ⋆a, λ
⋆
b) obtained in Theorem C.1 as limit of the smoothed problem. According to the
first point of Theorem C.1 and since V a(0, 0, 1) = V b(0, 1, 0) and V b(0, 0, 1) = V a(0, 1, 0), we get
Corollary 3.1 so that
E[I2h] = lim
n→+∞
V a,n(0, 1, 0) + V b,n(0, 1, 0) = V a(0, 1, 0) + V b(0, 1, 0).
Let V¯ a,n (resp. V¯ b,n) be defined as the backward form of the solutions V a,n (resp. V b,n) of (Sn),
more precisely
V¯ i,n(s, ·, ·) = V i,n(h− s, ·, ·), s ∈ [0, h], for i ∈ {a, b}.
In the same way, we denote by (V¯ a,nQ , V¯
b,n
Q ) the backward versions of the solution (V
a,n
Q , V
b,n
Q ) of
(SnQ). The functions (V¯
a,n
Q , V¯
b,n
Q ) are computed by solving the backward system (S
n
Q).
Finally note that
E[I2h] = lim
n→+∞
V¯ a,n(h, 1, 0) + V¯ b,n(h, 1, 0) ≈ V¯ a,nQ (h, 1, 0) + V¯ b,nQ (h, 1, 0).
Hence we use the quantity V¯ a,nQ (h, 1, 0) + V¯
b,n
Q (h, 1, 0) for n = 1000 and Q = 100 to approach more
accurately E[I2h].
D Model extension: Market makers can cancel their limit orders
We can extend our model and allow market makers to revise their position before the auction
clearing by cancelling their limit orders. Formally a market maker arrived at time τ ≤ τ cli will
maintain its position until the auction clearing at time t with a probability θ(t− τ cli ), where θ is a
[0, 1]-valued decreasing function such that θ(0) = 1. Hence, the number of market makers present
at the i− th auction clearing is
N˜τcl
i−1
− N˜τcl
i
, with N˜s =
Nmm
τcl
i∑
j=Nmm
τcl
i−1
+1
1Xk≤θ(τk−τcli )
,
where (Xj)j≥0 is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with uniform law on [0, 1]. We can show that
during auction time (N s)0≤s≤h = (N˜τopi +s)s≥0 has the same law than an inhomogeneous Poisson
process with intensity
λ(s) = µθ(t− s).
Moreover we still have an explicit formula for E.
Emid(h) = (1− e−mh ν
ν + µ
)−1eνh
∫ +∞
h
νe−νt
(
(σ2f
t
6
+ σ2)e−mt
∫ mt
0
es − 1
s
ds+ σ2f
t
3
(1− e−mt)
)
dt
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and
E(h) = Emid(h) +
E[I2
τ
op
1 +h
]
K2
(1− e−mh ν
ν + µ
)−1eνh
∫ +∞
h
νe−mte−mt
∫ mt
0
1
s
∫ s
0
eu − 1
u
dudsdt
with
mt =
∫ t
0
µθ(s)ds.
E Proof of Lemma 2.1
Consider for any s > τ cl1 , Xs = (P
cl
s − P s)2. We show that (Xs)s>τcl1 is a regenerative process with
renewal times given by (τ cli )i≥1.
Consider τ cli ≤ s < τ cli+1 we have
P
cl
s − P s =
1
N i,mm∆i
N
i,mm
∆i∑
k=1
(Pτcli
− P
τcli−1+τ
i,mm
k
) +
1
N i,mm∆i
N
i,mm
∆i∑
k=1
gk +
Ii∆i
KN i,mm∆i
. (29)
According to Assumption 1 the process (N i,mmt , I
i
t)t≥0 is independent from Fτcli−1 with same law as
(Nmmt , It)t≥0. Same results holds for (Pτcli−1+t
− Pτcli−1)t≥0 and (Pt − P0)t≥0 since P is a Brownian
motion. Consequently N i,mm∆i , I
i
∆i
and (Pτcli−1+t
− Pτcli−1)t≥0 are independent from (Xs)s<τcli with
same law as Nmm
τcl1
, Iτcl1
and (Pt − P0)t≥0.
Thus according to (29) and since X is piecewise continuous with jump at times (τ cli )i≥1, for any
τ cli ≤ s < τ cli+1, Xs is independent of (Xs)s<τcli and has the same distribution than Xτcl1 . Thus X is
regenerative with renewal times equal to (τ cli )i≥>1
Thus according to Theorem 3.1 Chap VI in Asmussen (2008) we have the almost sure convergence
∫ t
0 Xsds
t
→
t→+∞
E[
∫ τcl2
τcl1
Xsds]
E[τ cl2 − τ cl1 ]
=
E[τ cl2 − τ cl1 ]E[Xτcl1 ]
E[τ cl2 − τ cl1 ]
= E[Xτcl1
] = E[(Pτcl1
− P cl
τcl1
)2].
Thus we get the stated result.
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